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TOWARDS A FOREIGN POLICY OF MUTUALITY
Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
Montana State University, Bozeman, Montana
(:o~ ~~L~/.1J~

Saturday, June 10, 1972, 10:00 a.m., M.D.T.

I come here today to convey a word of optimism regarding
the nation's foreign relations .

Optimism in this connection is

long overdue; still, I hope my reference to it at this time is
not premature.

Whatever the case, my expectation is that history

may well record 1972 as the year in which a corner was turned
for peace.

There are indications that the world is headed back

t owards constructive human purpose in its major internat i onal
relationships.

A water-shed appears to have been reached after a

quarter century of dangerous dallying in the murky detours of the
Cold War.
Insofar as the government of th1s nation is concerned,
except in the case of Indochina, I believe the President is
responding in a new fashion to international circumstances.
is projecting not as adversary but as conciliator.

He

In so doing ,

- 2 he is paying heed to the legitimate claims of a public
sentiment

gr~wn

impatient wi th the words o f peace, sung to

the cadence o f war.
So, I address a word of hope especia ll y to you men and
women of this graduating class.
deal of credit

f~r

Your generation can take a great

bringing about this change.

Your manifest

disenchantment with the foreign policies of the past and with
the tragic travesty in the name of peace in Indochina has been
impressed on Washington.

You have underscored the point that

government is itself governed, in the fina l analysis, by the
depth and degree of public support which can be commanded for
its policies .
You have helped to inject balance into official channels
and, hopefully, to assure that government will not soon again
indulge in meaningless adventures abroad, largely at the expense
of young life.

If we are, in fact, going through the last Viet Nam,

if we are, in fact, getting out at last, as I devoutly hope, you
have done your share to that end .

- 3 To be sure, the millenium has not yet arrived .

Doomsday

missiles in the United States point at doomsday missiles several
thousand miles and a few minutes away .
on the mainland of Southeast Asia.

We still have vast ga rr isons

Planes are still engaged i n

ra i ning te rror out of the Indochina skies.

Ships sow the

i nstruments of destruction i n the wat ers south o f China .

Indeed,

the Secretary of Defense has just told us that the spread of
conflict, by sea and air, once again into North Vi et Nam--this
latest episode in the cont inuing agony of the Indochina War,
will cost the people of the nat ion an additional $5 billion
this year, not to speak of mo re lives, more prisone rs- of-war,
and more missing i n action.
Nor should we overlook , in any note of optimism, the
social and economic over loa d wh ich a r is es at home from these and
othe r wasting demands abroad; the capacities of the nat ion are
great but they a re not unlimited.

The st ra i n of serving, for a

quarter- of-a- century as the wor ld's leading policeman, banker,
pioneer i n space and what-not shows in the prices that are paid

- 4 ln every store in the nation.

It shows, too, 'n the neglect

of the env·ronment, in the decay of cities and i n the r ise of
crime, drug addiction and other barometers of social breakdown
within our society.
Before we can speak of any real light at the end o f the
tunnel, we must face up to the immediate problems of the trans i ti on
from the exertions of war to the work of peace.

That the

adjustments can be difficult and pa i nful has been brought home t o
us by the President's announcement that the ABM site at Ma l mstrom
wi ll become i noperative under the terms of the Nixon-Brezhnev
treaty.

In th i s case, as in many others, we must find--the

federal government has an obligation to ass i st i n f i nding-constructive alternatives .
These qualifications aside, however, the fact is that the
world has come a long distance towards sanity and order in the
short space of a few months .

That is why, in my judgment, the

class of 1972 can look with s ome confidence t o the future.

- 5 There is a chance that the evil genies which have plagued us for
a quarter century can be put back securely in the bottle.
Consider what has been achieved by the diplomacy of the
past year.

What comes to mind most vividly, of course, is the

President's just completed journey to Moscow .

The accords

which were c0ncluded there were highly significant i n themselves.
Yet, the most important resu lt of the Moscow summit may be found
not tn specific achievements. Rather, it may emerge from the
changes of national a tt1tude on both sides which were reflected
in the meetings.
The results of the Nix0n-Brezhnev talks indicated a clear
acceptance of mutual self-interest as the basis f or the future
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.
We have not always been very prompt in the past to rec ogn ize
nat·onal self-interest as a basis for a policy of peace.

To be

sure, we have sometimes over-assumed a national interest, as in
Vtet Nam and on that basis, spent the lives of tens of thousands

- 6 o f Amer i cans and permitted over
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b ill ·on doll ars t o be suc ked

up by the destructive sponge o f that confl .ct.

Now, after years

o f this deadly wastage we have at last discovered that our on l y
valid nationa l concern is to get back the prisoners o f war and
the recoverable missing in action.

We have come at last to

realize that our only national interest is to get out of the
Indochina involvement, lock, stock and barrel.
If on s0me occas i ons we have over- assumed nat j onal i nterests,
on others, we have ignored them almost as though they were not
f i tt i ng to a great power.

So, we have hes i t a ted to define our

bona f i de concerns and pursued, instead, the will o'the wisp of
ideological conflict .

We have done so on the basis of such

slogans as "Make the World Safe for Democracy," and most recently
the "Battle for the Minds of Men" or the "Containment of Communism."
The pursuit of ideological struggle has not led us to any victories.
Rather, it has projected us into a hodge-podge of foreign aid,
mi li tary alliances and into overseas pro paganda and other dub ious

- ·r m·tnlpulntlvc oper·lt,lonn .

The wnrm humAn concern or Amerlcnnt:

for o ther peoplen has been distorted by ideological warfnre nnd
we hnve plunged, w ttv>ut wurr·tnt, intn the internal pnlltlcnl
and coclal affairs or other nntlnns ev<'rywhere In the wo rld.
For two decades this costly exercise has become A way of 1 lfe ror
hundreds of thousAnds of Americans, some c>f whom hove scarcely
set foot In the United Stnt es for many years.

If there Is a new

Jlght of hope, It Is In large part because this random flnlltng
appears to be coming to A.n end.

In plnce of the cacophony or the

Cold War, the recent Moscow conference Sp)ke softly of "Basic
Principles of Mutual Relntlons between the Un lte d StAtes and the
U. S.S.R. 11

In these prlnclplf's , the twfl nations rec ognized that

there Is no feasible answer In a nuclear age to the prospect of
mutual annlhilntlon other than mutual collaboration .
The two powers have begun, now, to move toward what President
Nixon has called n position of
armAments .

11

mutuall y agreed restralnt 11 In

To that end, n treaty has been

ne~otiat ed

by President

- 9 N:xon

t~

limit o ffens've and defens i ve s trateg ic nuclear

on both sides .

we ~pons

As I have already indi cated, th i s treaty ha s a

special meaning for Montana because it j s expected that Ma l mstrom
will not be developed now as Rn ABM s i te .

In the ci rcumstances,

what I told the Senate in opposing the ABM program three years
ago bears repeating today.

On April 1, 1969, I said:

"If this

proposed ABM missile system . . . is right for the nat ion, it wi l1
be right for Montana.

If it is wrong for the nat·on, however, the

location of one s i te at Malmstrom cannot make i t rtght.
"What economic benefit to a Montana community will equal
the additional tax burdens and the new inflatjon which will
weigh on all the people of Montana ... ?

If the system becomes an

insatiable maw for the consumption of public resources, who wjll
pay for the neglect of other urgent needs , if not all the people
of the nation including Montanans? 11
That was my position on the ABM three years ago .
my position .

It remains

I will support the President in regard to the

Nixon- Br ezhnev Treaty .

- 9 -

The diplomacy by wh ich the treaty was negotiated is similar
to that wh ich led the Pres i dent to take the fi rst steps i n
breaking down the barriers of isolation and separation wi th the
People's Republ i c of Ch i na.

To digress fo r a moment for a personal

note, let me say that on March 29, 1968, I gave the f i rst lecture
sponsored by the Mike and Maureen Mansfie l d Foundat ion at the
University .

The subject was "Chi na:

Retrospect and Prospect."

My remarks, four years ago, contained th i s statement :
"It ought to be made unequ i vocal that we are
prepared at all t i mes to meet with Ch i nese
representatives -- formally or informa lly-- in
order to consider d j fferences between Chi na
and the Unjted Stat es ove r Viet Nam or any other
question of common concern. "
The President's visit to Peki ng early this year wh ich
wa s follo wed by the journey of the Senate Minority Leader and
myself a few weeks ago, has now made unequivocal the read i ness

-

l~

-

of this nat on to meet wi th China to the end that difficulties
may be

diss~lved

peooles.

and civil contact restored between the t wo

Four years is a long time.

it is a beginning.

It is a long delay--but

The Great Wall of separation has

to crumble and the way to a stable peace i n As i a is

c~mmenced

~pening

at last.

What the President has done with regard to the Chinese
Pe ~pl e's

Republic is to remove a self- i mposed straight-jacket

on the foreign policies of the nation .

Following World War II,

for example, rather than face the great upheava l wh ic h had taken
place i n China, we chose not to recogn i ze but to quarantine it .
We cut ourse l ves off

fr~m

contact wi th these monumenta l changes,

thinking a ll the while that by so do i ng we somehow could exerc i se
polit i cal control over them .

In retrospect, it is clear that we

had little or no effect over the course of events .
The fact is that there was a v i ab l e and i ndependent
government in control in Ch i na for many years before we chose
to acknowledge that such was the case .

It availed us nothing

- ll to ignore and isolate ourselves from that government.

Yet, we

continued to do so long after this policy had lost the last
shred of a rationale.
Now that myths have begun to be replaced by realities,
we can proceed to explore with the People's Republic of China,
as the President has started to do wi th the Soviet Un ion, the
possibilities of mutual accommodation .

The change comes very late .

Already, as I have indicated, the economy of the nat ion reveals
the stresses imposed by unrealistic and excessively costly
foreign-defense policies .

Last year, for example , it was necessary

to devalue the dollar, to raise import duties and to impose
domestic controls to prevent a catast r ophic breakdown in the
nation's financial grid.

The process of adjustment had been

delayed too long to make a graceful and painless trans ition and
it will be prudent to anticipate still other shocks i n the future.
Neverthe l ess, we are now moving in the di rection of
mutuality, of a sharing of responsibi lit i es and leadership wi th

- 12 -

other nations .

In part, this process depends on negotiat:ons.

In part, however, it is possjble to ta ke unilateral actions .
It is not always necessary to await the pleasure of others in
order t o lighten our self- imposed burdens .

I have, for example,

not hesitated to urge un ilateral action at various times w;th
regard to Vi et Nam in an effort to bring the involvement to a
more rapid conclus ion.

I have done so because the ending of th i s

mistaken adventure is our problem and our problem alone.

Every

day that the involvement persists adds to the burdens of the
people of th i s nation, to the list of dead and wounded and to the
devastation of the hapless people of Indochina.
an interest in our withdrawa l from this conflict.

Others may have
But none has

a more vital interest than this nation in getting out wi thout delay .
I have also urged unilateral action to bring about a
substantial reduction of U. S. forces in Europe.

There is no

rhyme or reason, i n my judgment, to keep more than half-million
U. S. military personnel and dependents in Western Europe a quarter

- 13 of a century after World War II at the expense of the people
of the United States.

Whatever purposes of foreign policy the

U. S. garrison in Europe may still serve, the same purposes can
be met by a far smaller contingent .

As it is now, this enormous

deployment is a drain on U. S. revenues; it is fuel for i nflation
in the United States and it is a major source of the weakness of
the dollar in re lation to the currencies of other nat ions .
I have stressed this is sue time and again against the
resistance of the Executive Branch under the Administrat ions of
three Presidents .

Insofar as I am concerned , it will continue

to be stressed, notwithstanding the Moscow agreements which call
for negotiation of mutual and balanced r eductions of forces in
Europe .

The fact i s that the Soviet Union does not pay for this

antiquated and la r gely i rre leva nt U. S. deployment .
do not pay for it .
their taxes.

The Europeans

The people of this nat ion pay the cost in

I s e e no particular virtue in prolonged negotiations

with the Russ ians to bring about a reduction of U. S . fo r ces which

- 14 should have been done years ago in our own interest .

I am

appalled to think of the billions which have already been
wasted in this long waiting game.
There was a time within the clear remembrance of many of
us here today, when the rhetoric of Cold War was part and parcel
of policy .

That was a time when there did not appear to be any

mutuality of interests between East and West and when it would
have been futile to urge unilateral steps to reduce tensions.
Those were the days when each nation was what George Washington
so correctly described as the

11

slave of its own animosity."

The essential fact in precipitating the Cold War was that
two powerful new fo r ces-- ideology and technology--came together at
the close of World War II .

Th i s fusion vastly complicated the

whole interplay of international affairs.
problem was awesome in its simplicity.

The technological

With the great flood of

scientific and engineering advances, governments came into
possession of the power of instant and worldwide destruct ion.
In consequence, the processes of statecraft were compressed in
time and altered radically in conduct .

- 15 In this country there was a Constitutional fall-out from
these technological developments.

The power of the Executive

Branch in foreign affairs increased drastically even as the
power of legislatures shrank in proportion.

In crises, so it

was reasoned, there would not be time to make political decisions,
much less debate the issues.

At the same time, the new technology

of war, by its scope and complexity, became more than ever a
partner of government, with a vested interest in its own perpetuity
and a high potential for distorting public decisions about war
and peace.
The other aspect of the Cold War--the ideological problem-arose from the fact that two of the victors in World War li-- the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China--were revolut iona ry
states committed to a system of social and economic organization
which was anathema to this nation.

The conspiratorial aspect of

Communism posed a particularly painful problem for the United
States, breeding suspicion, distrust and division in government.

- 16 It became d i fficult to separate valid threats to nat·ona l
security from the bombast of the power-seekers .

Enlightened

public debate became constrained and as a result public policy
was not always subjected as fully as it should have been to the
purgative of critical challenge .

So the political paroxysms

of the '50's led to the rigid policies of the •6o•s.
History may well record that we pursued the correct foreign
policies into the early 1960's; that we bought time, through
containment and counterforce, to permit the gradual moderation
of Communist power, thereby reducing the Marxist states to the
political dimensions of other nations .

However that may be, it

has been apparent for some time that we persisted in these policies
too long.

We were blind to changes elsewhere and to the possibili-

ties of adjusting to mutual interest.
the disaster of Viet Nam .

In the end, we came to

It is part of the price which has been

exacted for the obstinate pursuit of the obsolete in foreign
policy .

- 17 How can it be prevented from happening again?

Quite

poss i bly the world will not soon see a repetition of the
particular confluence of historical forces--ideology and
technology--which produced the rigidities of the Cold War.
Poss i b l y, the awareness of our own electorate may now be such
that prolonged periods of national self- delusion will no longer
be countenanced.

Perhaps, more effective techniques will be

found in the art of government which wi ll act to limber the dead
weight of massive bureaucracy and so bring about a greater
responsiveness to changing circumstances both at home and
abroad.

Perhaps, the addition of the under-21-voters to the

electorate will revitalize the entire political process.

In

any event, it is doubtful that your generation--seared as it
has been by the folly and outrage of Viet Nam- - will long
suffer in silence a foreign policy which is based on the
outdated.

- 18 In the final analysis it comes down to the degree
to which an enlightened and vigorous electorate will probe
and test and call to account the policies of its own government.
President Brewster of Ya le has put it in these words:
"Exposure, questioning, reappraisal are often
painful, even agonizing; their price is noth i ng,
however, compared to the resentment aroused by a
feeling of manipulated ignorance. 11
Your generation has some reason to feel, I'm sure, that
it has paid the high price of ''manipulated ignorance ."

At least

you have the advantage of knowing clearly what your generation
must avoid.

I am confident that you can and will not only skirt

the pitfalls of the past , but being thus spared the old burdens,
you will be free to explore the vast possibilities of mutual
accommodation with all peoples in a wor ld which is now beginning
to be liberated from its obsolete fears.
You can do no more.

You should do no less.

